Abstract. We present a sound and strongly complete axiomatization of a reasoning about linear combinations of conditional probabilities, including comparative statements. The developed logic is decidable, with a PSPACE containment for the decision procedure.
Introduction
The present paper constitutes an effort to proceed along the lines of the research presented in [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7], on the formal development of probabilistic logics, where probability statements are expressed by probabilistic operators expressing bounds on the probability of a propositional formula. It is an extension of [1], which was presented at the 13 th ESSLLI Student Session in Hamburg, 2008. This extension consists of introducing multiple conditional probability operators , ∈ ℐ, where ℐ is a finite nonempty set of indices. These operators can be thought of as agents, with each of them having his own independent assessment of the conditional probability of an event. For instance, we formally write the statement "The conditional probability of given viewed by agent is at least the sum of conditional probabilities of given viewed by agent and twice given viewed by agent ." as ( , ) ( , ) + 2 · ( , ). We also prove that the developed logic is decidable, and show how it can be used to represent evidence.
In the classical Kolmogorovian sense, the conditional event " given " can be considered only in the case when ( ) > 0, and for such a conditional event, we have that
This may introduce certain difficulties in the formal construction of probabilistic formulas. It would be much easier if ( | ) was a well-defined term, regardless of the formulas and , and the possible value of ( ).
An elegant solution can be obtained by adopting the convention that −1 is a total operation, so that we can extend Kolmogorov's definition of conditional probability onto all events: ( | ) = ( ∧ ) ( ) −1 . In particular, if ( ) = 0, then ( ∧ ) = 0, so ( | ) = ( ∧ ) ( ) −1 = 0 · ( ) −1 = 0. From this we observe that the actual value of 0 −1 is irrelevant for the computation of ( | ), and that in the case when ( ) = 0, the conditional probability defined as above behaves correctly. For the sake of simplicity, we let 0 −1 = 1. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the syntax of the logic is given and the class of measurable probabilistic models is described. Section 3 contains the corresponding axiomatization and introduces the notion of deduction. A proof of the completeness theorem is presented in Section 4, whereas the decidability of the logic is analyzed in Section 5. Representing evidence in the developed logic is discussed in Section 6, and concluding remarks are in Section 7.
Syntax and semantics
Let Var = { | < } be the set of propositional variables. The corresponding set of all propositional formulas over Var will be denoted by For , and is defined in the usual way. Propositional formulas will be denoted by , and , possibly with indices. Let ℐ be a finite nonempty set of indices.
Definition 2.1. The set Term of all probabilistic terms is recursively defined as follows:
Term( ). Probabilistic terms will be denoted by f, g and h, possibly with indices. To simplify notation, we introduce the following convention:
If and are propositional formulas, and ∈ ℐ, then the probabilistic term ( , ) reads "the conditional probability of given viewed by agent ". To simplify notation, we will write ( ) instead of ( , ⊤), where ⊤ is an arbitrary tautology instance. Definition 2.2. A basic probabilistic formula is any formula of the form f 0. Furthermore, we define the following abbreviations:
A probabilistic formula is a Boolean combination of basic probabilistic formulas.
As in the propositional case, ¬ and ∧ are the primitive connectives, while all of the other connectives are introduced in the usual way. Probabilistic formulas will be denoted by , and , possibly with indices. The set of all probabilistic formulas will be denoted by For .
By "formula" we mean either a classical formula or a probabilistic formula. We do not allow for the mixing of those types of formulas, nor for the nesting of the probability operators . Formulas will be denoted by Φ, Ψ and Θ, possibly with indices. The set of all formulas will be denoted by For.
We define the notion of a model as a special kind of Kripke model. Namely, a model is any tuple ⟨ , , { | ∈ ℐ}, ⟩ such that: • is a nonempty set. As usual, its elements will be called worlds.
• is an algebra of sets over .
• for each ∈ ℐ, : −→ [0, 1] is a finitely additive probability measure.
• : For × −→ {0, 1} is a truth assignment 1 compatible with ¬ and ∧. That is, (¬ , ) = 1 − ( , ) and ( for all ∈ For .
Definition 2.3. Let = ⟨ , , { | ∈ ℐ}, ⟩ be any measurable model. We define the satisfiability relation recursively as follows:
where f is recursively defined as follows:
A formula Φ is satisfiable if there is a measurable model such that Φ; Φ is valid if it is satisfied in every measurable model. We say that the set of formulas is satisfiable if there is a measurable model such that Φ for all Φ ∈ .
Notice that the last two clauses of Definition 2.3 provide the validity of each tautology instance.
Axiomatization
In this section we will introduce the axioms and inference rules for our logic. The set of axioms of our axiomatic system, which we denote LPCP , is divided into three groups: axioms for propositional reasoning, axioms for probabilistic reasoning and arithmetical axioms. Axioms for propositional reasoning:
A1. (Φ 1 , . . . , Φ ), where ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ For is any tautology and Φ are either all propositional or all probabilistic.
Axioms for probabilistic reasoning ( ∈ ℐ):
Arithmetical axioms:
, whenever ; A24.
Inference rules R1. From Φ and Φ → Ψ infer Ψ. R2. From infer ( ) = 1, for all ∈ ℐ. R3. From the set of premises
Let us briefly comment on the axioms and inference rules. The axioms A2-A6 provide the required properties of probability, the axioms A7-A13 capture the equality (1.1) using the fact that Q is dense in R, while the axioms A14-A30 provide the properties required for computation. In the inference rules, R1 is modus ponens, R2 resembles necessitation, while R3 enforces that non-Archimedean probabilites are not permitted. Definition 3.1. A formula Φ is deducible from a set of sentences ( ⊢ Φ) if there is an at most countable sequence of formulas Φ 0 , Φ 1 , . . . , Φ, such that every Φ is an axiom or a formula from the set , or it is derived from the preceding formulas by an inference rule. A formula Φ is a theorem (⊢ Φ) if it is deducible from the empty set. A set of sentences is consistent if there is at least one formula from For , and at least one formula from For that are not deducible from . Otherwise, is inconsistent. A consistent set of sentences is said to be maximally consistent if for every ∈ For, either ∈ or ¬ ∈ . A set is deductively closed if for every Φ ∈ For, if ⊢ Φ, then Φ ∈ .
Observe that the length of the inference may be any successor ordinal lesser than the first uncountable ordinal 1 .
Completeness
In this section we will prove that the proposed axiomatization is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all measurable models.
Using a straightforward induction on the length of the inference, one can easily show that the above axiomatization is sound with respect to the class of all measurable models.
Theorem 4.1 (Deduction theorem). Suppose that is an arbitrary set of formulas and that
Proof. If ⊢ Φ → Ψ, then clearly ∪ {Φ} ⊢ Φ → Ψ, so, by modus ponens (R1), ∪ {Φ} ⊢ Ψ. Conversely, let ∪ {Φ} ⊢ Ψ. As in the classical case, we will use induction on the length of the inference to prove that ⊢ Φ → Ψ. The proof differs from the classical one only in the cases when we apply the infinitary inference rule R3.
Suppose that Ψ is the formula → f 0 and
The next technical lemma will be used in the construction of a maximally consistent extension of a consistent set of formulas. Proof. The proof is based on the reductio ad absurdum argument. Thus, let us suppose that ∪ { → f < − −1 } is inconsistent for all . Due to the Deduction theorem, we can conclude that ⊢ → f − −1 , for all . By R3, ⊢ → f 0, so is inconsistent; a contradiction. Definition 4.1. Suppose that is a consistent set of formulas and that For = { | = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }. We define a completion * of inductively as follows: Obviously, each is consistent. In the next theorem we will prove that * is deductively closed, consistent and maximal with respect to For . (1)
* is deductively closed, id est,
Proof. We will prove only the first clause, since the remaining clauses can be proved in the same way as in the classical case. In order to do so, it is sufficient to prove the following four claims: (i): Each instance of any axiom is in
(i): If Φ ∈ For , then Φ ∈ 0 . Otherwise, there exists a nonnegative integer , such that Φ = . Since ⊢ , ⊢ as well, and so ∈ +1 . (ii): If Φ, Φ → Ψ ∈ For , then Ψ ∈ 0 . Otherwise, let Φ = , Ψ = , and Φ → Ψ = . Then, Ψ is a deductive consequence of each , where max( , ) + 1. Let ¬Ψ = . If ∈ +1 , then ¬Ψ is a deductive consequence of each , where + 1. So, for every max( , , ) + 1, ⊢ Ψ ∧ ¬Ψ, a contradiction. Thus, ¬Ψ ̸ ∈ * . On the other hand, if also Ψ ̸ ∈ * , we have that ∪ {Ψ} ⊢ ⊥, and ∪ {¬Ψ} ⊢ ⊥, for max( , ) + 1, a contradiction with the consistency of . Thus, Ψ ∈ * .
(iii): If ∈ * , then ∈ 0 , so ( ) = 1 ∈ 0 for all ∈ ℐ.
(iv): Suppose that { → f − −1 | = 0, 1, 2, . . . } is a subset of * . We want to prove that → f 0 ∈ * . The proof uses the reductio ad absurdum argument. So, let → f 0 = and let us suppose that ∪ { } is inconsistent. and
In particular, ⊢ → f 0, i. e. ⊢ for all sufficiently large . But, / ∈ * , so is inconsistent with all , . It follows that each is inconsistent for sufficiently large , a contradiction.
Thus, ∪ { } is consistent, so → f 0 ∈ +1 .
For the given completion * , we define a canonical model * as follows:
• is the set of all functions : For −→ {0, 1} with the following properties: -is compatible with ¬ and ∧. -( ) = 1 for each ∈ * .
• : For × −→ {0, 1} is defined by ( , ) = 1 iff ( ) = 1.
* is a measurable model.
Proof. We need to prove that is an algebra of sets and that each is a finitely additive probability measure. It is easy to see that is an algebra of sets, Since Q is dense in R, we may choose an increasing sequence 0 < 1 < 2 < · · · and a decreasing sequence 0 > 1 > 2 > · · · in Q such that lim = lim = . Using the definition of and Theorem 4.2(4), we obtain that * ⊢ ( ) and that * ⊢ ( ) < , for all . We may also choose increasing sequences ( ) ∈ and ( ) ∈ , and decreasing sequences ( ) ∈ and ( ) ∈ in Q, such that lim = lim = and lim = lim = . So,
Using the arithmetical axioms, we have
for all . Using A6 and A30, we obtain that
and lim + − = lim + − = + − , we obtain that ([ ∨ ]) = + − .
Theorem 4.3 (Strong completeness theorem). Every consistent set of formulas has a measurable model.
Proof. Let be a consistent set of formulas. We can extend it to a maximally consistent set * , and define a canonical model * , as above. By induction on the complexity of the formulas, we can prove that * Φ iff Φ ∈ * . To begin the induction, let Φ = ∈ For . If ∈ * , i.e., * ⊢ , then, by definition of * ,
, by the completeness of classical propositional logic, * ⊢ , and ∈ * . Let us suppose that f 0 ∈ * . Then, using the axioms A16-A19, A22-A25 and A30, we can prove that
for some , ∈ Q and some , ∈ For , ∈ ℐ. Moreover, according to the axioms A7, A16, A20 and A30, we may assume that
. Using the axioms A16, A17, A18,A19, A22, A23 and A24, we can prove that * ⊢ f = 16 + 4 1 ( 1 , 1 ) + 7 2 ( 2 , 2 ),
Moreover, if * ⊢ 1 ( 1 ) = 0, then, by A7, * ⊢ 1 ( 1 , 1 ) = 0. Using A30, we obtain that * ⊢ 4 1 ( 1 , 1 ) = 4 · 0. Since ⊢ 0 = 4 · 0 (A16), it follows from A30 that * ⊢ 4 1 ( 1 , 1 ) = 0 Finally, by (4.1), A20 and A30, we obtain that * ⊢ 16 + 7 2 ( 2 , 2 ) 0, and, similarly, that
. We need to prove that
}. So, we may choose increasing sequences ( inc , ) ∈ and decreasing sequences (
, , for ∈ {1, . . . , } and ∈ . Without the loss of generality, suppose that * ⊢ 0, for 1 , and * ⊢ < 0, for < . Then, by the arithmetical axioms,
for all . Consequently,
, from the construction of * , there is a positive integer such that f < − −1 ∈ * . Reasoning as above, we have that f * < 0, which is a contradiction. So, f 0 ∈ * . Let Φ = ¬ ∈ For . Then 
Decidability
Theorem 5.1. Satisfiability of probabilistic formulas is decidable.
Proof. Up to equivalence, each probabilistic formula is a finite disjunction of finite conjunctions of literals, where a literal is either a basic probabilistic formula, or a negation of a basic probabilistic formula. Thus, it is sufficient to show the decidability of the satisfiability problem for the formulas of the form
Suppose that 1 , . . . , are all of the propositional letters appearing in (5.1). Let 1 , . . . , 2 be all of the formulas of the form ± 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ± , where + = and − = ¬ . Clearly, are pairwise disjoint and form a partition of ⊤. Furthermore, for each appearing in (5.1) there is a unique set ⊆ {1, . . . , 2 } such that ↔ ⋁︀ ∈ is a tautology. Now we can equivalently rewrite (5.1) as
Let the set { 1 , . . . , } ⊆ ℐ be the set of all of the different conditional probability indices used in (5.1), and let ( (1, 1) , . . . , (2 , 1) , . . . , (1, ) , . . . , (2 , ) ), ( (1, 1) , . . . , (2 , 1 ) , . . . , (1, ) , . . . , (2 , ) ) be the formulas
Furthermore, let ( (1, 1) , . . . , (2 , 1) , . . . , (1, ) , . . . , (2 , ) ) be the formula
Then, it is easy to see that (5.1) is satisfiable iff the sentence
is satisfied in the ordered field of reals. Formally, the first order language of fields does not contain " −1 " and "−". However, both of intended functions are definable. For instance, "
−1 " can be defined by the formula ( , ): .2) may be seen as a first order formula of the language of ordered fields -definitions by extensions, see [8] . By a well known result [9] , satisfiability of sentences of in the ordered field of reals is decidable.
Let us suppose that there is only one conditional probability operator, i.e., there is only one agent. It should be noted that this logic can be embedded into the logic described in [3] , which has a PSPACE containment for the decision procedure. Also, the rewriting of formulas from our logic into that logic can be accomplished in linear time:
which is representable in [3] . Moreover, the generalization of the logic from [3] to a multi-agent case is straightforward. Thus, we conclude that our logic is also decidable in PSPACE.
Representing evidence
In [4] , Halpern and Pucella presented a first-order logic for reasoning about evidence. It includes propositional formulas on hypotheses ℋ, observations , probabilities 1 and 2 of formulas before and after the observation, the evidence ( , ℎ) provided by the observation for the hypothesis ℎ, and quantification by real-valued variables. They posed an open question whether it is possible to axiomatize their logic without resorting to quantification. Intuitively, the evidence function represents the "weight" that an observation leads to the fulfillment of a hypothesis. In [4] , it was shown that the evidence can be seen as a function which maps prior probability 1 to posterior probability 2 , using Dempster's Rule of Combination. For more details, we refer reader to [4] .
In this section we will show how evidence can be represented in the developed logic. We will introduce the following modifications:
(1) there is a finite number of propositional letters divided into two categories: Var = ℋ ∪ , where ℋ = {ℎ 1 , . . . , ℎ } are used to denote hypotheses, = { 1 , . . . , } are used to denote observations, and ℋ ∩ = ∅; (2) there are only two conditional probability operators -1 and 2 , which will be interpreted as prior and posterior conditional probabilities, respectively; (3) there is an additional syntactic object -( , ℎ), where ∈ , ℎ ∈ ℋ; (4) the definition of Term (0) 
